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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to conceive the 
possibility of applying the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) requirements where Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
augmentations are considered for the Automatic 
Take-Off and Landing (ATOL). An aircraft, 
belonging to the Medium Altitude Long 
Endurance (MALE) category of Unmanned 
Aerial System (UAS) has been considered as 
case-study. Once the avionic architecture has 
been designed, the Safety and risk analysis was 
carried out with a particular focus on 
Functional Hazard Analysis and Fault Tree 
Analysis techniques. The proposed methodology 
allows the researchers to evaluate the reliability 
of each avionic equipment and the safety level 
of the whole avionic system. Furthermore, the 
results pointed out the main criticalities of the 
architecture and some future in-depth studies 
are proposed. 
1 General Introduction  
The Risk and Safety Analysis is one of the 
most important evaluations that should be 
performed since from the beginning of the 
design phase. Moreover, it is also an activity 
proposed by the most important System 
Engineering methodologies reported in 
literature [1] [2]. Its increasing relevance is 
mainly due to the fact that this type of analysis 
allows to prevent design errors and to choose 
the safer configurations among a group of 
possible architectures. Like all the other 
analyses that are performed during the whole 
Product Life Cycle, the Safety and Risk 
Analysis is inserted in an iterative process and it 
can be performed at different levels of detail.  
In this article, typical tools of Risk and 
Safety Analysis are applied to an aircraft 
belonging to a MALE UAS category to 
conceive the possibility of applying the 
Required Navigation Performance (RPN) 
requirements where Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) augmentations are considered 
for the Automatic Take-Off and Landing 
(ATOL). This study has been performed within 
the SMAT (Sistema di Monitoraggio Avanzato 
del Territorio – Advanced Territory Monitoring 
System) research program, a project funded by 
Regione Piemonte e Fondo Europeo di Sviluppo 
Regionale, now at its second phase. In 
particular, SMAT F2 proposes to study and 
demonstrate an advanced monitoring system to 
accomplish planned tasks and to prevent and 
monitor different types of emergency, using a 
fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 
This field of studies is in-line with the market 
trends. In particular, as far as our particular 
case-study is concerned, it has been noticed that 
the steady increase in the Air Traffic (AT) 
together with the more stringent constraints for 
fuel consumption and emissions reduction 
produced the need of improving some 
navigation performances, especially for the civil 
aviation aircraft. The basic idea here proposed is 
to use the GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite 
System) Signal in Space (SIS) performances [3]. 
Three are the main fields of interest for the 
improvement of the Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) functionalities: Communication, 
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Navigation and Surveillance, in accordance with 
[4]. As far as communication and surveillance 
fields are concerned, the adoption of new data 
links, able to elaborate greater data flows, can 
allow improvements for the performances. 
Conversely, navigation is the main field of 
interest in which a big amount of new 
technology improvements are focused in order 
to obtain more accurate estimation of the 
aircraft position. The augmentation systems of 
GPS-SIS are the basic element of these new 
avionic technologies presented and discussed in 
the following sections. Firstly, the paper deals 
with the analysis of the state of the art of 
avionic navigation systems (certified Area 
Navigation (RNAV) and/or Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP)) today 
implemented, or under-development, in the civil 
aviation. In this context, a particular attention is 
paid to the new techniques and relative 
technologies requested for precision approaches 
with vertical guidance (i.e. APV). The paper 
also includes a detailed analysis of the 
international normative listed through ICAO 
and FAA documents focusing on the new 
augmentation systems (SBAS – Satellite Based 
Augmentation System, GBAS – Ground Based 
Augmentation System, ABAS – Aircraft Based 
Augmentation System) and its relative 
Technical Standard Operations (TSO) 
requirements. In the second part of the article 
the integration of these systems has been 
supposed into an UAS avionic architecture in 
order to perform autonomous landing. Then, a 
Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) focused on 
the ATOL function is performed. After Risk 
considerations, Safety analysis has been applied 
to the designed avionic system, for verifying 
that important redundancies considered in 
avionic design could ensure safety levels 
requested for operations. To this purpose, Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) is proposed. Finally, the 
most promising design alternatives are 
described and some design improvements are 
suggested in order to design an ATOL system 
able to comply with the safety requirements.  
2 Background and generalities about 
Navigation systems 
In order to understand the functionalities 
implemented in the avionic system 
configuration that will be proposed in a 
following section, it is necessary to provide an 
overview of the state-of-art technologies and the 
International Rules requirements.  
2.1 Background and ICAO Road Map 
Through the Assembly Resolution A37-11 
contained in [5], the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) indicated to all the 
members the implementation of the new 
airworthiness set of requirements called 
Performance Based Navigation (PBN), listed in 
ICAO document 9613 [6]. PBN is defined as the 
international regulatory framework to 
standardise the implementation of Area 
Navigation (i.e. RNAV) worldwide [6], with a 
focus on the performances requested for the 
aircraft approach operations with vertical 
guidance (Approach with vertical guidance, 
APV). RNAV is the main operating standard 
navigation for the civil aviation. Today, almost 
all the civil aircraft have adequate area 
navigation performances, but only the modern 
jet-aircraft implement Required Navigation 
Performances (RNP) which represent the new 
standard requirements for modern civil avionic 
systems layout, reported in [6]. The APV 
procedures are based on the GNSS and 
Barometric Vertical Navigation (Baro-VNAV) 
functionalities, allowing accurate and 
continuous capacities of lateral and vertical 
guidance without any support from the common 
terrestrial radio navigation systems such as 
Instrumental Landing System (ILS). It is 
convenient to notice that the integration 
between vertical guidance and lateral guidance 
would greatly reduce the risk of fatal accidents 
during approach and landing operations.  
ICAO identified the Baro-VNAV and the 
augmented GNSS systems as the suitable 
technologies to ensure vertical guidance 
performances. Between these two systems, the 
augmented GNSS has been selected for our 
purposes, because it is also suitable for older 
and smaller aircraft.  
From the ICAO Air Navigation 
Conference (ANC-11) all the members 
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confirmed their intentions to perform and 
improve satellite navigation performances 
through the implementation of the PBN. Finally, 
in the above-mentioned AC-36-23, ICAO 
suggests to all members the implementation of 
the APV methodology as the new approach and 
landing procedure. Moreover, this technology 
can also be exploited in order to guarantee 
“back-up mode” for Precision Approach (PA). 
Furthermore, ICAO established a timeline for 
implementation of the PBN and RNP navigation 
performances on each national territory of State 
members and it is reported in [6]. 
2.1 PBN and RNP: General Guideline and 
Navigation System 
PBN enables the transition from the 
classical sensor-based navigation to the modern 
performance-based navigation. The first one is 
the navigation strategy adopted by the majority 
of the civil aircraft for over 40 years. As far as 
this navigation strategy is concerned, each flight 
track is based on direct signals issued from 
ground-based radio navigation aids. This 
method reveals that the routes are completely 
dependent by the terrestrial location of the 
navigation beacons resulting in longer and less 
efficiency routes. Conversely, through the PBN 
navigation requirements, RNAV defines a 
navigation method that allows the aircraft 
operations along any desired flight route within 
the coverage of the terrestrial-reference 
navigation aids. This type of navigation 
completely removes all the restriction imposed 
by the sensor-based navigation. In particular, 
the PBN concept defines the RNAV navigation 
systems performances in terms of integrity, 
accuracy, availability, continuity and 
functionality levels requested for each specific 
aircraft operations. Today, the Basic GNSS 
equipment, introduced after the ANC-10, are 
under development through the implementation 
of the augmentation systems such as SBAS and 
GBAS, while the performances of the GNSS 
systems will be further improved by the 
introduction of Galileo and a more efficient 
GLONASS system.  
The RNP specifications [6] [7] include all 
the requirements for the on-board self-contained 
performance monitoring and alerting systems 
and procedures. These specifications should be 
considered as the primary way to verify the 
requested safety levels of the navigation 
systems, relating both to longitudinal and lateral 
navigation performances. Indeed, they allow the 
crew to immediately detect whether the 
navigation system achieves the navigation 
performances requested for the operation.  
The use of navigation systems RNP-
certified offers sensible safety, operational and 
efficiency benefits during the entire mission. 
Indeed, the implementation of the vertical 
guidance performances provides the progress of 
navigation applications from 2D (along the 
track and lateral control) to 3D. In this contest it 
is important to underline that navigation 
systems certified PBN/RNAV are not 
automatically certified RNP, and vice-versa. In 
particular, through the implementation of the 
PBN specifications, it is possible to ensure 
RNAV capabilities. The determination of 
aircraft position can be performed by every 
navigation systems that respect the RNP or 
RNAV specification imposed by the airspace of 
operation. The ICAO document number 9613 
[6] reports the entire navigation specifications 
structure here shortly described with the RNP 
specifications. Examples of civil aircraft with 
RNP capabilities are: Airbus A320, Airbus 
A380, Boeing B-737 NG and Boeing B787.  
As far as RNAV navigation systems are 
concerned, they are designed to ensure proper 
accuracy levels with repeatable and predictable 
flight trajectories through the integration of 
input information from different kinds of 
avionic equipment.  Among them, the most 
important to be considered are the air data 
sensors, the inertial reference system and the 
radio and satellite navigation coupled with the 
internal navigation databases. The basic 
functions that can be ensured by a general 
RNAV system are: navigation, flight plan 
management, guidance and system control. 
Typically, the RNAV navigation systems are 
multiple-sensor based including GNSS, DME, 
VOR and IRS and navigation databases, which 
contain all the pre-stored information about the 
navigation aid locations, route and procedures.  
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2 Approach and Landing Procedures  
As it is outlined in the previous sections, 
this article deals with the Risk and Safety 
Analysis of an avionic system able to permit the 
UAV to perform automatic take-off and landing. 
For this reason, in the following subsections, at 
first traditional procedures are examined and 
then, new augmentation systems are introduced. 
3.1 State of Art technologies 
Commonly, the approach procedures are 
exclusively based on the ground navigation aids, 
such as ILS, VOR and Non Directional Beacon 
(NDB). It is important to underline that the PBN 
requirements do not include any RNAV 
approach specifications for approach and 
landing operations. Consequently, the RNAV 
(GNSS) approaches have been reclassified as 
RNP Approach with Lateral guidance (RNP 
APCH-LNAV). These types of approach 
procedure are only referred to the RNP APCH 
specifications which include desired accuracy 
values of lateral guidance (LNAV) for all 
phases of flight of instrument approach 
manoeuvres: initial, intermediate, final and, 
eventually, missed approach segment, as shown 
in the following Figure. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Typical UAS approach maneuvers. 
 
Two classes of RNP approach operations 
have been defined: the RNP APCH and RNP 
AR APC. The first one is characterised by a 
RNP value for final approach segment fixed at 
0.3 nm for RNP APCH, varying from 0.3 nm to 
0.1 nm for RNP AR APCH. Another important 
difference between them is that RNP APCH 
may include vertical guidance, while RNP AR 
APCH always includes vertical guidance and 
requires specific crew training and operational 
approval. The categories of RNP APCH 
procedures that today can be performed are 
essentially four: 
• RNP APCH - LNAV: where lateral 
guidance is provided by the GNSS Signal 
In Space (SIS).  
• RNP APCH - LNAV/VNAV: where the 
GNSS SIS ensures lateral and vertical 
guidance provided also by barometric 
vertical navigation (Baro - VNAV). 
• RNP APCH - LP (Localiser Performance): 
where lateral guidance performances, 
equivalent to localiser approach, is 
provided by augmented GNSS SIS.  
• RNP APCH - LPV (Localiser Performance 
with Vertical guidance): where lateral and 
vertical guidance is provided by 
augmented GNSS SIS, such as SBAS. This 
approach technique is similar to the GNSS-
ILS approach procedure.   
It has also important to remind that, before 
the advent of the vertical guidance, the approach 
classification was divided in only two types of 
approach strategies: Non-Precision Approach 
(NPA) and Precision Approach (PA). Once the 
ICAO resolution A36-23 has been released, a 
third classification of Approach with vertical 
Guidance (APV), was defined by ICAO as  
“An instrument approach procedure 
which utilises lateral and vertical guidance but 
does not meet the requirements established for 
precision approach and landing operations”. 
The table below clearly summarizes the 
actual situation for approach and landing 
procedures. 
3.2     Augmentation systems 
All the required specifications, regulating 
the implementation of the satellite systems such 
as GNSS and GLONASS for air navigation, are 
summarised in the ICAO document “Annex 10 
Aeronautical Telecommunications” [10]. 
Considered augmentation systems for the 
GNSS SIS are: the Aircraft-Based 
Augmentation System (ABAS), the Satellite-
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Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and the 
Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS). 
Annex 10 reports all the basic technical 
requirements for each augmentation system 
mentioned. As far as ABAS systems are 
considered, the most important element is the 
GNSS receiver that is integrated with the 
sensors inside the navigation sub-system. 
Conversely, the main feature of the SBAS 
system is represented by its ability to correct the 
navigation errors introduced by the ionosphere. 
The high levels of integrity and accuracy 
ensured by the SBAS systems allow matching 
the requirements for APV approach procedures. 
There are four different performance levels, or 
Classes, that can be reached through SBAS 
systems, depending on the needed corrections 
and then on the integrity and accuracy level 
requested for the navigation sub-system. They 
are:  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. System Engineering iterative approach 
 
 
• Class I: SBAS systems supported the en-
route, terminal and LNAV approach 
procedures) 
• Class II: SBAS systems supported the 
en-route thorough LNAV/VNAV 
approach procedures 
• Class III and IV: SBAS systems 
supported the en-route and terminal with 
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LPV, LP, LNAV and LNAV/VNAV 
approach procedures 
Considering GBAS system, the requirements 
are regulated through standard RTCA/DO-253A 
and by FAA TSO-C161a and TSO-C162a but 
indications are also present in the ICAO 
document Annex 10 in which it is clearly 
defined the GBAS systems as “able to manage 
more than 49 approaches at the same time” 
support PA CAT-I procedures.  
Inside the “Annex 10 Standard and 
Recommended Practises” (SARPs) is also 
indicated that GBAS augmentation systems will 
be considered Precision Approaches CAT-II and 
CAT-III certified, but this is still under 
development and test. The FAA AC 20-138c, 
coupled with the ICAO documents, has to be 
considered like the most powerful reference for 
all TSO necessary for implementation of 
augmented GNSS systems. 
4 Avionic System proposed for ATOL 
functionalities 
Once the main topics and navigation 
requirements have been introduced, this 
paragraph proposes an avionic architecture 
suitable for an Unmanned Aerial platform able 
to ensure Automatic Landing capabilities. The 
configuration that will be used has been 
proposed by Alenia Aermacchi, one the major 
partner in SMAT F2 project and it is the results 
of an iterative design process in which 
Functional Analysis had a relevant role. The 
scheme reported in Figure 2 shows the logical 
and chronological sequence of activities that has 
to be performed as suggested by System 
Engineering Methodologies [8], [9], [10]. 
The selected avionic architecture is a 
“Duplex type architecture” composed by two 
main Data Buses connecting all systems for 
exchanging data information. On the right and 
the left side of the scheme proposed all the 
augmentation systems earlier described are 
reported, without the presence of ILS, VOR, 
DME and NBD system: the commonly 
terrestrial navigation aids.  
The presented avionic architecture is 
designed to perform APV approach procedures. 
Each single augmentation system primary sends 
its output to the CMU, directly connected with 
one of the main data buses. A “switch box” 
(yellow box in the Figure) allows the control 
station to switch from automatic to manual 
control of the UAS platform. 
5 Safety and Risk Analysis 
Once the avionic architecture has been 
defined, the safety and risk analysis has been 
carried out. The primary goal of the safety 
process is to ensure the detection, and then the 
evaluation, of safety critical conditions that 
might affect the UAS operations. The steps 
followed for the Safety Analysis are:  
• Avionic system description,  
• Functional Hazard Analysis  
• System Safety Assessment (SSA).  
The aim of the SSA is to assess the risk 
related with the applicable hazards. In 
particular, in our case the main focus is on UAS 
Landing operations. The SSA performed is 
based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and uses 
the values obtained from FMECA analysis here 
not reported.  
It is to be noticed that UAS is equipped 
with a Flight Termination System (FTS), which 
is a parachute useful to prevent the flight 
outside the segregated airspace or in order to 
limit damages in the case of the UAS results 
completely out of control.  
Typically, this system can be activated by 
ground station or by UAS on-board systems in 
the case of detected loss of control.  
5.2 Methodology overview 
The Risk Assessment is composed by two main 
phases: the first one deals with the detection of 
hazardous events, assigning to them a severity 
or probability category belonging to 5 levels: 
Catastrophic, Critical, Major, Minor and No 
Safety [11] [12]. 
Failure Rate values (FR) of the considered 
avionic equipment are reported below. The 
presented data derive directly from Equipment 
Supplier/Manufacturer when possible, or are In-
service data coming from Jane’s Avionics [6]. 
In the case where it has not been possible to 
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obtain reliability data from Equipment 
Supplier/Manufacturer datasheets or literature, 
NPRD-11 library (Non Electronic Parts 
Reliability Data) has been used for deriving 
them. Furthermore, the following tables show 
each avionic item with its relative FR value. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Avionic system architecture. 
 
 
Tab. 1. Safety requirements. 
 
 
Tab. 2. Differential GPS RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 3. AHRS RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 4. MSU RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 5. Flight Control Computer RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 6. Air Data System RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 7. Inertial Navigation System RAMS estimations. 
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Tab. 8. On Board Mission Computer RAMS estimations. 
 
Tab. 9. RADALT RAMS estimations. 
5.3 Fault Hazard Analysis 
The Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) is a 
systematic and in-depth analysis performed in 
order to detect and classify all the possible fault 
conditions [13] [14] [15]. The input data of the 
FHA are: safety requirements, critical 
categories, functional and system analysis. As it 
has been previously noticed, this type of 
analysis can be done since the very beginning of 
the design phase until the last verification 
phases. Moreover, it can be applied both at 
system level (e.g. aircraft) and sub-system level 
(e.g. avionic sub-system). 
The output of the FHA typically consists 
of a list of hazardous events classified according 
to each single critical level assigned and 
characterised by their probability value. Table 
10 reports the FHA analysis performed at 
aircraft level. 
 
 
Tab. 10. FHA analysis. 
 
For the aim of this work, the safety 
analysis has been conducted for the following 
hazardous events only, because they have been 
considered the most relevant:  
• Loss of control during landing before 
DH with uncontrolled crash in OC  
• Loss of ATOL function before DH 
• Loss of ATOL function after DH 
5.4 Fault Tree Analysis  
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a 
deductive failure analysis focused on one 
particular undesired event providing a method 
for determining all causes that produce this 
event [13] [15]. The analysis starts from the 
identification of a particular Top Level hazard 
event selected between the FHA results in the 
table above. Then, the Top Event is analysed 
until all failures (called Basic Events) causing 
this Top Event are systematically identified 
following the typical “Top-down” approach. 
The top event causes are themselves examined 
to determine their immediate causes. This 
process is repeated, identifying the sources of 
system events at varying level of complexity, 
down to the lowest level of decomposition: the 
basic events. A Fault Tree diagram is a 
graphical representation of the logical 
interconnection between the failures and the 
conditional events based on the Reliability 
Block Diagram analysis of the avionic 
architecture, here not reported. The Top events 
proposed, as it has been already said, are the 
UAS catastrophic event “Loss of control during 
landing after DH with uncontrolled crash in 
OC” together with the “Loss of ATOL 
function”. The last is analysed both in the case 
it happens before or after the Decision Height 
point; in the first case it is possible to suppose 
Minor Effects while in the second case Major 
Effects can be hypothesized.   
The main output produced by a 
quantitative FTA Evaluation is the numerical 
probability of the under-investigation Top 
Event. 
In order to perform the quantitative FTA 
Evaluation process, the FR of each Basic Event 
and the “Exposure Risk Time” of the Basic 
Events should be set. As far as the Exposure 
Risk Time is concerned, it is convenient to 
notice that it should be associated with losses 
and/or malfunctions of a function/item used 
during the entire ATOL flight procedures. In 
this case the Exposure Risk Time is the 
estimated time of a long duration standard flight 
requested for the UAS platform and it has been 
set equal to 36 hours. In the FTA Evaluation 
each considered avionic item has been assumed 
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as “not reparable”.  
In addition to these considerations, it 
could be convenient to report some definitions. 
• Q(t) is the calculated value for the 
unavailability (i.e. the probability of 
failure at a given time point).  
• Q(H) is the ratio Q(t) to the mission 
time, which as already said is 
supposed to be 36 hours.  
 
 
Fig. 4. FTA diagram for loss of control during landing 
after DH with uncontrolled crash in OC function. 
 
Using the FR above reported, the Fault 
Tree diagrams have been drawn.  To this 
purpose, a Reliability software, called Ram 
Commander® has been selected. Figures 4 and 
5 shows the FTA diagrams obtained for the two 
top selected top events.   
The numerical results of the performed 
FTA are summarized in Table 11 and 12. 
 
 
Tab. 11. FTA results for loss of control during landing 
after DH with uncontrolled crash in OC function. 
 
 
Tab. 12. FTA results for loss of ATOL functionalities. 
 
 
Fig. 5. FTA diagram for loss of ATOL functionalities. 
5.5 Results 
Once the FHA and the FTA have been 
performed, it is possible to associate to each 
failure condition, the results of these analyses 
and verify if the safety requirements, specified 
at the beginning of the process, are satisfied. In 
case the safety analysis underlines that the 
system is not compliant with the requirements, 
corrective actions should be hypothesized and 
an enhanced version of the avionic system 
provided. As it has already been outlined, this is 
a typical iterative process that ends when the 
designed configuration matches the safety 
requirements imposed by the Certification 
Entities. 
Considering the case that has been 
proposed in this work, Table 11 reports the 
results of the analyses, the level of severity 
associated with the relative failure condition 
considered and the safety requirement that has 
to be satisfied (Objective). 
Moreover, Table 11 reveals that the 
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Avionic Architecture proposed in Figure 3, 
provided by Alenia Aermacchi, results 
compliant with the above-mentioned EASA CS-
25 Safety Objectives. It is also important to 
highlight that the case of Total Loss of ATOL 
functions during landing is equal to the 
probability of Total Loss of Deviation 
Estimation for the same flight phase, for this 
reason the associated Reliability Block 
Diagrams and Fault Tree result to be the 
equivalent. In the same way, RBD and FTA 
associated to the Total loss of Deviation 
Estimation during T/O are equivalent to the 
ones for the Total Loss of ATOL functionalities 
during T/O. 
 
Tab. 11. Safety analysis results 
6 Conclusions 
The risk and safety analysis methodology 
described in this paper reveals that the avionic 
architecture hypothesized to perform an 
autonomous take off and landing it is compliant 
with the safety requirements. Thus, in future, 
further in-depth studies could be performed at 
component level, following the iterative process 
typical of the system engineering. 
References 
[1] INCOSE, System Engineering Handbook, June 2006 
[2] NASA, System Engineering Handbook, 2013 
[3] ICAO, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
Manual Doc 9849, (2012) 
[4] ICAO, Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air 
Traffic Management Doc 4444, (2001). 
[5] ICAO, Assembly Resolution in Force Doc 9958, 
(2010). 
[6] ICAO, Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual 
Doc 9613, (2008). 
[7] ICAO, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight 
Procedure Design Doc 9906, Volume V, (2009). 
[8] N. Viola, S. Corpino, M. Fioriti and F. Stesina, 
Functional Analysis in Systems Engineering: 
methodology and applications in Prof. Dr. Boris Cogan . 
Systems Engineering - Practice and Theory. p. 71-96, 
RIJEKA, InTech, ISBN: 9789535103226, doi: 
10.5772/34556 (2012). 
[9] R. Ian Faulconbridge, Michael J. Ryan, Managing 
Complex Technical Projects: A Systems Engineering 
Approach  
 [10] S. Chiesa, M. Fioriti, N. Viola. Methodology for an 
integrated definition of a System and its Subsystems: the 
case-study of an Airplane and its Subsystems in “Systems 
Engineering - Practice and Theory, ISBN: 978-953-51-
0322-6”, INTECH (2012) 
[11] H. E. Roland, B. Moriarty System Safety Engineering 
and Management, 2nd Edition, Wiley (1990) 
[12] D. Ozuncer, L. Speijker, J. Stoop, R.  Curran, 
Development of a Safety Assessment Methodology for the 
Risk of Collision of an Unmanned Aircraft System with 
the Ground (2011) 
[13] S. Chiesa, Affidabilità, sicurezza e manutenzione nel 
progetto dei sistemi, CLUT (2008) 
[14] D. O. Anderson, Hazard Analysis in Engineering 
Design, 2001 
[15] M. Waßmuth, S. C. Stilkerich, E. Lübbers, 
Distributed Safety Assessment for Airborne Systems. 
 
Copyright Statement 
The authors confirm that they, and/or their company 
or organization, hold copyright on all of the original 
material included in this paper. The authors also confirm 
that they have obtained permission, from the copyright 
holder of any third party material included in this paper, 
to publish it as part of their paper. The authors confirm 
that they give permission, or have obtained permission 
from the copyright holder of this paper, for the 
publication and distribution of this paper as part of the 
ICAS2014 proceedings or as individual off-prints from 
the proceedings. 
